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Despite the economic transformation of Peru’s coastal economy, the country’s inland region 
remains poor and underdeveloped. We herein examine the economic linkages between the two 
regions using a multi-regional computable general equilibrium model based on a regionalized 
social accounting matrix. The model results show that coastal growth undermines the inland 
economy by increasing import competition and internal migration. Peru, therefore, cannot rely 
solely on rapid national growth to generate broad-based poverty reduction. When we simulate 
policies aimed at curbing divergence, we find that reducing interregional transaction costs 
stimulates national economic growth, but widens divergence by shifting inland production 
towards agriculture and concentrating investment in coastal manufacturing. In contrast, 
conditional cash transfers reduce regional and rural-urban inequality, but do not stimulate 
national growth. Finally, investing in inland productivity (through extension services and 
improved rural roads) reduces regional divergence, but the resulting market constraints worsen 
rural-urban inequality. These findings suggest that isolated interventions may worsen inequality, 
and that complementarities exist between supply-side investments and policies aimed at 
stimulating demand and improving access to national markets. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The persistence of rural poverty in Peru’s inland Sierra and Selva regions is one of the country’s most 
pressing socioeconomic problems. Peru made some progress in reducing national poverty during the 
1990s, but this was later reversed by the economic slowdown during 1997-2001 (World Bank, 2005). The 
Peruvian economy has boomed since then, with national gross domestic product (GDP) growing at over 5 
percent per year and poverty declining significantly. This recent expansion has been driven by 
particularly strong growth in mining and manufacturing (INEI, 2008). However, employment creation is 
still dominated by low-paying informal services (World Bank, 2005) and poverty remains high, with two-
fifths of the population living below the poverty line in 2007 (INEI, 2009). Moreover, the gains from this 
rapid economic growth have been largely concentrated in urban areas and along the coast, with poverty, 
particularly extreme poverty, declining only marginally in the rural inland regions.  
Inland poverty would be a less serious problem for the country as a whole if the population of 
these regions were small. However, the Sierra and Selva regions contain half of Peru’s total population 
and 90 percent of its extremely poor population (INEI, 2006). The problem would also be less serious if 
these regions were catching up with the coastal economy. However, there is little evidence to suggest that 
regional convergence is taking place. Currently Peru’s economy is expanding at over 7 percent per year, 
but the problem of the country’s backward regions persists. Indeed, the very success of the coastal agro-
industrial sectors is widening regional inequality, increasing divergence and exacerbating social and 
political pressures in and between the regions. What is striking about this recent boom period is the 
difference in poverty trajectory between the urban and rural sectors, in particular the gap that is emerging 
between Lima on the ond hand and the Coast and Sierra-Selva regions on the other.
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Thus, Peru has a structural ‘lagging regions’ problem common to many fast-growing developing 
countries. It has a geographic area containing a significant share of the population, whose development 
has systematically lagged behind that of the rest of the country. The underlying mechanics that have 
generated growth at the national level in the past have not improved incomes for the poor in Peru’s inland 
regions. This raises two important developmental issues. First, we can conclude that the poor in the Sierra 
and Selva regions are either not well linked to the more advanced coastal economy, or they are linked in a 
way that reinforces regional divergence. Second, as a result of these weak or adverse regional linkages, it 
is unlikely that Peru will be able to solve its rural poverty problem by focusing on accelerating its national 
growth rate. Peru is a clear example of a case in which growth does not trickle down to the poor. For this 
reason, policy interventions or changes in the country’s growth strategy will be required to improve the 
linkages between the inland and coastal economies and allow the poor to benefit more from the growth 
process.  
 For instance, the 
overall poverty rate in the rural sector of Peru increased during the boom, largely because the poverty 
reductions in the Coast and Selva regions were offset by poverty increases in the more populous rural 
sector of the Sierra region. Indeed, overall poverty rates fell by 35.6 percent on the coast between 2004 
and 2007, but by only 9.4 percent in the Sierra and Selva regions. Moreover, poverty rates in the inland 
region remained virtually unchanged during the first two years of the economic boom (i.e., 2004-2006), 
while they declined dramatically along the coast. The contrast between the regions is even more evident 
for extreme poverty, which rose in the Sierra region during 2004-2006. In short, poverty in the coastal 
region has proven to be highly sensitive to the rate of economic growth, whereas inland poverty has not 
(World Bank, 2005).  
In this paper, we address both of these development issues. In Section 2, we measure the linkages 
between the inland and coastal economies using regional social accounting matrices (SAM) and evidence 
from the literature. Drawing on this information, we construct a dynamic multi-region computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, which is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we use the model to consider 
how the recent boom in Peru’s coastal economy affects the inland economy. We find that, while coastal 
                                                       
1 For an analysis of the regional poverty statistics between 1997 and 2004, see Escobal and Valdivia (2004); for the 2004-
2006 period, see INEI, 2009.   2 
growth increases household incomes, it has adverse effects on regional and rural/urban divergence. In 
Section 5 we examine three possible policy responses to this divergence. We first consider the effects of 
investing in interregional road infrastructure, thereby reducing the ‘remoteness’ of Peru’s lagging region. 
Secondly, we consider the impact of increasing social transfers to inland households and raising 
productivity in the region. Finally, we consider investments aimed at improving agricultural productivity 
in the inland and coastal regions. These three scenarios reflect alternative uses of public resources to 
address the concentration of growth and poverty reduction within the coastal region, and are therefore 
relevant to the allocation decisions underlying the current system of regional public transfers. The final 
section draws conclusions for the lagging region problem in Peru and elsewhere. 
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2. REGIONAL LINKAGES IN PERU 
Uneven development is characteristic of rapid growth episodes in most countries. However, lagging 
regions may become a national development problem when regional inequalities persist over a long 
period of time despite the occurrence of structural transformation elsewhere in the economy. Regions may 
initially fall behind for a number of reasons, including climatic handicaps, ethnic differences, regionally 
discriminatory policies, and civil wars. Regional divergence may continue even after the initial 
differences become less binding, due to the agglomeration of economic activity and the resulting path-
dependency of the development process. In Peru, mountains form a natural division between the narrow 
coastal region and the inland Sierra and Selva regions. While the coast contains half of the country’s 
population and two-thirds of its urban population, the inland region contains most of the rural population, 
and a large proportion of the poor and extremely poor. Given this sharp regional division, it might seem 
appropriate to treat the lagging and leading regions as isolated countries, thus implicitly assuming that 
there are no linkages between them. In this section, we consider the appropriateness of this assumption. 
Drawing on a multi-regional SAM constructed by Morley et al. (2008), we examine four kinds of 
linkages: production and trade flows; labor markets and internal migration; capital markets and 
investment; and public spending and social transfers. 
Production and Trade Linkages 
The coastal and inland regions have very different economic structures. The coastal economy, which 
accounts for 70 percent of national GDP, is dominated by urban-based manufacturing and private services 
(see Table 1). Agriculture is less important and consists mainly of larger-scale commercial enterprises. In 
contrast, the inland regions are heavily dependent on agriculture, most of which is undertaken by 
smallholder farmers. Although mining and the refinement of non-ferrous metals are major sectors in the 
inland region, most heavy manufacturing takes place on the coast. Inland manufacturing, on the other 
hand, consists mainly of light industries, such as food processing, textiles and wood products. Despite its 
smaller economy, however, the inland region accounts for almost half of Peru’s foreign earnings. This can 
be seen in the macro SAM for the two regions (see Table 2).
2
                                                       
2 A SAM is a consistent framework that captures all of the economic flows in an economy. The SAM is a square matrix, in 
which rows represent receipts and columns are payments. The Macro SAM in Table 2 is an aggregate version of the detailed 
SAM described in Morley et al. (2008). 
 In the table, ‘foreign exports’ are payments 
from the rest of the world for locally produced commodities, while exports appear in the ‘rest of world’ 
column and the ‘commodities’ row (i.e., coastal and inland foreign exports equaled 18.2 and 14.6 billion 
soles, respectively, in 2002). The inland region’s large contribution to exports is primarily through mining 
and metals, although coffee, fish and wood products are also important inland exports. Thus, while the 
inland region runs a foreign trade surplus equal to 11 percent of its GDP, the coastal region runs an 
equally large trade deficit. This is the first trade-related linkage between the two regions, and comes 
through their contributions to a common current account balance. If the two regions were separate 
countries, then the inland region could offset its competitive disadvantage through adjustments to its 
exchange rate policy. By devaluing its exchange rate, the inland region could improve the 
competitiveness of its foreign exports. However, because the regions are part of a single country with a 
common trade policy, changes in the terms-of-trade or export performance of one region will influence 
the other region by inducing changes in Peru’s exchange rate.    4 
Table 1. Summary statistics of coastal and inland regions 
  Year  National    Coastal    Inland 
        Both  Rural  Urban    Both  Rural  Urban 
                      Population (1000s)  2004  26,420    13,109  1,259  11,850    13,311  7,224  6,086 
                             Poverty rate (%)  2004  46.8    35.1  51.2  33.5    62.7  72.9  50.4 
  2006  44.5    28.7  49.0  26.5    61.5  73.1  43.4 
  2007  39.3    22.6  38.1  21.2    56.8  68.9  37.6 
Extreme poverty rate (%)  2004  17.1    4.0  13.8  3.1    30.9  40.7  15.3 
  2006  16.1    3.0  14.4  1.8    30.1  41.2  12.9 
  2007  13.7    2.0  10.5  1.2    26.1  36.6  9.3 
                             Expenditure per capita (S/p.a.)  2002  5,414    7,627  3,212  8,096    3,234  1,592  5,182 
GDP per capita (S/p.a.)  2002  6,798    9,541   -  -     4,096       
                             GDP at factor cost (S/mil)  2002  179,592    125,069   -  -     54,523   -  -  
  Agriculture    13,962    4,407   -  -     9,556   -  -  
  Mining    8,190    2,174   -  -     6,016   -  -  
  Manufacturing    28,246    20,056   -  -     8,190   -  -  
  Other industry    15,404    8,817   -  -     6,587   -  -  
  Services    113,789    89,614   -  -     24,175   -  -  
                             Dependency ratio (people/worker)  2004  2.67    2.45  2.85  2.42    2.94  3.40  2.53 
                             Employment (1000s)  2002  9,879    5,347  442  4,905    4,532  2,126  2,406 
  Skilled    1,148    758  0  758    390  0  390 
  Semi-skilled    3,764    2,539  84  2,455    1,225  254  971 
  Unskilled    4,967    2,050  358  1,692    2,917  1,872  1,045 
                             Wage rates (S/per worker p.a.)  2002  8,174    10,470   -   -    5,466   -   - 
  Skilled    15,918    18,031   -   -    11,811   -   - 
  Semi-skilled    10,981    11,687   -   -    9,519   -   - 
  Unskilled    4,258    6,167   -   -    2,916   -   - 
                             Regional trade surplus  2002  0    15,056   -  -     -15,056  -   -  
Foreign trade surplus  2002  -5,692    -11,688   -  -     5,996  -   -  
Fiscal surplus  2002  -1,650    2,057   -  -     -3,707  -   -  
                     
Source: Population is from 2004 ENAHO (INEI, 2006); poverty rates are from INEI (2009); data on expenditures, GDP and trade and fiscal surpluses are from the 2002 Peru SAM 
(Morley et al., 2008); employment, wages and dependency ratios are the authors’ calculations using the 2002 Peru SAM and 2004 ENAHO. 
Note: Labor skills are based on occupational categories (skilled includes professional and managers; semi-skilled includes formal sales workers and machinery operators; unskilled 
includes agricultural and domestic workers and informal retailers). We assume that rural households have (at most) semi-skilled labor.   5 
 
 
Table 2. Macro social accounting matrix (SAM) for Peru’s coastal and inland regions (2002, millions of Soles)  













Activities    221,122 
100,699                221,122 
100,699 
Commodities  96,053 
46,176      99,984 
43,045 
12,932 








Factors  125,069 
54,523              1,154 
 0    126,223 
54,523 
Households      120,124 
50,024    6,288  
2,157          126,413 
52,181 
Government             21,278 
5,751        21,278 
5,751 





538            21,278 
5,751 
Savings        24,720 
8,597 
2,057  







linkages    9,295 
23,197                9,295 
24,351 
Rest of World    28,270 
6,305 
1,634  
2,308              29,904 
8,614 

















8,614   
Source: Morley et al. (2008) 
Note: The top number in each cell represents the coastal region and the bottom number represents the inland region 
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The SAM also captures interregional trade between the two regions. These are payments by one 
region for the other region’s commodities (i.e., the ‘regional linkages’ row and column in Table 2, 
representing regional exports and regional imports, respectively). The macro SAM shows that 
interregional trade is as important as international trade for the two regions: first, the inland region 
imports most of its manufactured goods from the coast; and second, international imports must travel 
through the coastal region to reach the inland region. As such, the inland region relies heavily on 
imported trade services, which are embodied in its imported manufactures. This results in high transaction 
costs between the coastal and inland regions. Overall, the inland region’s regional trade deficit is equal to 
27 percent of its GDP. This is partially offset by agriculture-related exports to the coast (e.g., horticultural 
products, livestock and wood products). These exports supply around half of the coastal consumption of 
these goods. Since the regional trade balance is far larger than most countries’ external balances, it is 
clear that there are substantial interregional trade linkages in Peru despite the country’s difficult terrain. 
Production changes in the coastal region will therefore have significant implications for producers and 
consumers in the inland region. If the inland region were a separate country, it could adjust its trade 
policies. For example, the inland region could protect local producers by imposing tariffs on coastal 
imports. However, there are no sub-national trade policies in place at present, and domestic producers 
face regional competition (albeit constrained by high interregional transaction costs).  
Capital Markets and Investment 
The second linkage between the regions is in the capital market. Both regions generate savings and make 
investments. The SAM does not have a regionalized financial sector, which is equivalent to assuming that 
all savings go into a national pool to be allocated to investment as determined by relative profit rates. In 
essence, all sectors in both regions compete for the national supply of savings, which means that if profit 
rates are higher on the coast, inland savings should be drawn out of the region, thus exacerbating 
tendencies toward divergence. Conversely, if returns are higher in the inland region, then investment 
could be drawn away from the coast, thereby helping to reduce divergence between the regions. 
The investment column in the macro SAM distributes total investment across the two regions, 
while the savings row identifies how investment is financed. Under the ex post equilibrium condition, 
total investment equals total saving in each region. As mentioned above, the coastal region runs a large 
trade surplus with the inland region and a smaller trade deficit with the rest of the world. Coastal 
households also generate a larger share of domestic private savings. To some extent, this explains the 
larger allocation of investment to the coastal region. However, investment is not allocated to regions 
according to savings contributions. The macro SAM shows that the coastal region financed a quarter of 
inland investment during 2002. If the two regions were separate countries, they could use capital controls 
to prevent large outflows to other regions. However, as regions within a country and given Peru’s 
established financial systems, there are few policies and barriers to prevent the inland region’s profits and 
savings from being reinvested in the coastal region where returns may be higher. Conversely, national 
capital markets may provide the financing needed to allow investment to rise beyond regional savings. 
Finally, it is worth noting that investment responds to sectoral or firm-level profit differentials. For this 
reason, while the inland region is dominated by land-intensive agriculture, the region may still attract a 
larger share of investment due to higher returns to more capital-intensive mining and manufacturing. It is 
therefore more difficult to predict sectoral capital movements than it is to predict regional labor 
migrations.  
Public Sector and Social Transfers  
Government is a potential channel for reducing regional inequality, through either targeted expenditures 
or social transfers. Governments raise revenues through taxes and use these revenues to finance public 
investments, social transfers, and recurrent expenditures. Due to its low-income population and small 
formal sector, the inland region ran a large fiscal deficit during 2002 (equal to 6.8 percent of its GDP). 
Conversely, the coastal region raised more tax revenues than were spent in the region, and therefore 
financed a large share of the inland region’s fiscal deficit. These transferred tax revenues contributed to 
the provision of social services (e.g., education and health) in the inland region; in 2002, they were equal   7 
to the social transfers paid directly to inland households. However, despite the interregional subsidization 
of public services, the coastal region still attracted more than 70 percent of public sector spending in that 
year, a large proportion of which was directed towards the central government. Only 8 percent of national 
tax revenues were redistributed from the coast to the inland region. Thus, compared to interregional trade, 
the reallocation of public funds is a less significant source of regional linkages. However, in the absence 
of other possible policy interventions, the public sector is currently the primary mechanism for 
stimulating regional growth and convergence.  
Labor Markets and Internal Migration 
The fourth linkage between the two regional economies is the migration of labor from inland regions to 
the coast. Employment in the inland region primarily consists of lower-skilled jobs, reflecting the 
importance of agriculture. Most better-paying semi-skilled jobs are in manufacturing, while skilled labor 
is almost exclusively employed in the public sector. In contrast, the coastal economy generates far more 
employment opportunities for semi-skilled workers. There are also large between-region differences in 
average wages. This is especially true for lower-skilled workers, with inland workers earning less than 
half what workers in similar occupations earn in the coastal region. Semi-skilled wage differentials are 
narrower, due in large part to the existence of higher-paying mining and public sector jobs in the inland 
region. Finally, dependency ratios are also higher in the inland region, suggesting that not only do inland 
workers tend to have lower skills and wages, each worker’s income also typically supports more 
dependents than is the case in coastal households. This accounts for some of the differences in per capita 
expenditure between the inland and coastal regions.  
Evidence suggests that workers respond to relative wage differentials by moving over time from 
low-wage occupations in the inland region to higher-wage labor markets on the coast (Laszlo and Santor, 
2004). A key empirical question is what fraction of the low-wage region’s labor force moves per time 
period. If the fraction is large, then the regional disparities in earnings are likely to be transitory. 
However, if the fraction is small, then large income disparities may persist. Furthermore, it may seem 
obvious that migration is a dynamic equilibrating mechanism, since the movement of workers will tend to 
reduce regional wage differentials. However, since the rate of return to capital is a positive function of the 
supply of labor, out-migration from the inland region will also tend to increase the rate of return to capital 
on the coast. Since the regional allocation of investment is a function of the relative rates of return, both 
investment and the capital stock will tend to move toward the area that receives migrants and away from 
the sending region. This exacerbates differences in regional growth rates and further highlights the 
importance of regional linkages.  
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3. MODELING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE COASTAL AND INLAND REGIONS  
The discussion in the previous section suggests that it would be incorrect to treat Peru’s lagging region as 
an isolated economy or a separate country. There are numerous linkages between the coastal and inland 
regions, some of which exist because these regions are part of the same country. Here, we construct a 
multi-regional recursive-dynamic CGE model designed to capture the linkages described in the previous 
section. This section describes the structure and behavior of the model, while a detailed mathematical 
specification is provided in the appendix. 
A Two-Region CGE Model of Peru 
The coastal region contains most of Peru’s manufacturing and private services, while the inland region 
depends more on agriculture and mining. To capture this heterogeneity, the model contains detailed 
information on the demand and supply of 37 economic sectors/commodities in each of the two regions.
3
The first regional link is trade. The model explicitly allows for interregional and international 
trade. Import competition and export opportunities are captured by allowing producers and consumers in 
each region to shift between regional and foreign markets depending on the relative prices of imports, 
exports and local goods. More specifically, the decision of producers in each region to supply local, 
regional or foreign markets is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, while 
substitution possibilities between local and imported goods are captured with a CES Armington function. 
Although this specification allows for two-way trade between the two domestic regions, it is only possible 
to estimate net flows. This means that if a region is initially a net importer of a commodity, then it cannot 
later become a net exporter. In most cases, this is not an unreasonable assumption. For example, natural 
conditions make it unlikely that the coastal region could become a net exporter of agricultural and mining 
goods to the inland region. Increased coastal production can, however, expand its exports to international 
markets and/or substitute for imports from the inland region. Finally, the model also captures 
interregional transaction costs, which are imposed on all goods entering or leaving the inland region. We 
assume that this additional cost of regional trade generates demand for the exporting region’s trade sector. 
Therefore, by explicitly allowing for interregional trade and transaction costs, the model captures the 
commodity market linkage between the two regions.  
 
Producers employ land, labor and capital under the assumption of constant returns-to-scale and profit 
maximization. For this, we use a nested production system, with a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function that determines factor demand and a Leontief function that combines value-added and 
intermediates. The model separates skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, which are used with 
differing intensity in each sector. We assume that workers within each region migrate between sectors 
according to labor demand, and that Peru’s total labor supply grows at a fixed rate (i.e., national 
unemployment rates remain constant). Agricultural producers use unskilled labor, region-specific land, 
and (to a lesser extent) capital. Nonagricultural producers also use labor and capital, although the mining 
sector has its own capital stock. All existing capital is immobile across sectors, earning sector-specific 
profits. The detailed specification of production and factor markets in the model allows it to capture the 
unique structure of these two regions’ economies.  
Household income and expenditure patterns vary considerably across regions and between rural 
and urban areas. These differences are important, since the incomes earned by workers in different sectors 
will benefit households differently according to their location and factor endowments. To capture these 
differences, the model separates rural and urban households in each region. These representative 
households receive factor incomes and per capita transfers from the national government. Rural 
households receive most of their incomes from land and lower-skilled workers, while urban households 
receive a greater share from non-mining capital and higher-skilled workers. All households save some of 
their incomes (based on fixed marginal propensities to save), but only urban households pay taxes (based 
                                                       
3 The model focuses on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which have 15 and 12 sub-sectors, respectively. 
However, the model captures all sectors, including mining, construction, utilities, and various private and public services. For 
more details on the database, see Morley et al. (2008).   9 
on fixed tax rates). Each household uses its remaining income to consume commodities under a linear 
expenditure system (LES) of demand. 
The second regional link is internal labor migration. The model allows workers in each region to 
migrate to the other region if relative wages are higher. However, the labor markets in the model are 
imperfect, and regional wages may not equalize over the medium-term. Using a linear migration function, 
we assume that if the coastal wage differential rises by 1 percent relative to the base period differential, 
then there is a 0.2 percent net out-migration of inland workers to the coast. As mentioned in the previous 
section, large wage differentials already exist between the coastal and inland regions. To some extent, this 
reflects differences in regional living costs and the socioeconomic costs of migration. We therefore 
assume an equilibrium-compensating wage, such that long-run factor mobility tends to the initial wage 
differential rather than equalization. The model also captures the influence of migration on population 
growth. Each migrating worker co-migrates with a third of the dependents from their representative 
household. This assumption is consistent with the observation that younger workers with smaller families 
more often migrate, leaving an aging non-working population in the inland region. Since there is no 
demographic model embedded in the CGE model, we assume that the national population grows in line 
with the labor force (i.e., the national dependency ratios remain constant). Finally, the allocation of new 
migrants between rural and urban areas occurs in proportion to the working population of the home and 
destination regions. This specification of migration and population growth allows the model to capture 
labor market linkages between the two regions and the demographic effects of this linkage.  
The third regional link is the public sector. Being connected to a larger economy allows the 
inland region to run a larger recurrent fiscal deficit than would be possible if it were a separate country. In 
the base period, the inland region receives a larger share of government spending than its share of tax 
revenues. The model captures this by pooling all tax collections at the national level, including region-
specific sales and income taxes and import tariffs. Public sector borrowing, which is a fixed share of 
public revenues, is also pooled. The national government first uses these revenues to fund per capita-
based household transfers in each region. The remaining funds are then used for recurrent consumption 
expenditures, which are allocated in fixed proportions across regions.
4
The fourth and final regional link is savings and capital investment. As discussed above, it is 
possible for a region to receive a larger share of investment than its contribution to savings if producers in 
that region are able to earn a higher return on capital. The model captures this as follows. First, all public 
and private savings and foreign borrowing are pooled at the national-level, thus determining the total 
amount of investment spending in the economy. Second, investment spending is allocated across sectors 
and regions according to profit-rate differentials. Sectors and regions with above-average returns receive 
larger shares of new capital, which is needed to augment depreciating stocks. Capital accumulation is 
therefore endogenous and investment spending is determined at the sectoral level. Under this 
specification, inland savings may be invested in the coastal region if profit rates are higher there. 
Conversely, the inland region can attract investment beyond the level that can be financed by the region’s 
own savings. 
 Therefore, regional tax collections 
vary with each region’s GDP, but regional public spending is determined by population growth and past 
expenditure patterns. The latter include the current system of regional transfers to local municipalities 
(e.g., the canon).  
Calibrating the Model  
The main database used to calibrate the model is a 2002 multi-regional SAM for Peru (Morley et al., 
2008). The SAM captures the structure of the country after the economic crisis and before the recent 
growth acceleration. In the SAM, data on regional production come from agricultural surveys and 
national accounts. Information on labor markets and household income and expenditure patterns are taken 
from the 2004 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (a nationally-representative household survey, see INEI, 
2006). Interregional trade flows are calculated as a residual, after reconciliation of regional production 
                                                       
4 Notably, while the government’s recurrent consumption spending is exogenously allocated across regions based on past 
trends, public investments are endogenously determined alongside private investments (i.e., based on regional profit 
differentials).   10 
and demand data. The model also contains a number of elasticities. Trade elasticities are taken from 
Dimaranan et al. (2006),
5
 
 while commodity-specific income elasticities are econometrically estimated for 
rural and urban households using data from the 2004 household survey.  
                                                       
5 The Global Trade Analysis Project’s (GTAP) model estimates lower elasticities for manufactures and traded services, and 
higher elasticities for agricultural goods, which are more disaggregated or homogenous in both the GTAP and the current model.   11 
4. SOURCES OF GROWTH AND DIVERGENCE  
Recent growth in Peru has reduced poverty, but mainly along the coast. This implies that growth in the 
coastal region may not stimulate growth throughout the economy. The previous sections highlight the 
linkages between the two regions. In this section, we use the CGE model to examine the implications of 
these linkages.  
Scenario 1: A ‘Balanced Growth’ Baseline Scenario 
We initially calibrate the model to produce a baseline scenario in which both regions grow equally fast. 
We run the model forward over 10 periods while updating exogenous parameters. For convenience, we 
refer to these time periods as years. We assume that the total supply of land and skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled labor grows at 2 percent per year. We also calibrate investment prices such that capital stocks 
grow at roughly 2 percent per year (after applying a 5 percent depreciation rate). Finally, we impose 1 
percent annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth in all sectors in both regions. Together, 2 percent 
factor growth and 1 percent TFP growth yield a national GDP growth rate of around 3 percent (see Table 
3). GDP growth deviates only slightly between the two regions. This is due to differences in their 
economic structures and elasticities. For example, the income elasticities for the kinds of goods produced 
in the inland region are typically lower than those for most coastal goods. Since growth is fairly balanced 
across the regions, there is no significant shift in wage differentials and few incentives for labor to 
migrate between regions. Accordingly, employment grows at about 2 percent in both regions, which also 
means that the population shares remain unchanged. Thus, under the baseline scenario, we do not see 
significant regional or divergence.  
Table 3. Macroeconomic results for growth scenarios 

















             
    Final period values 
             
Consumer prices (index)  1.00  1.01  0.93  1.00  1.00  1.04 
   Coastal  1.00  1.01  0.92  0.99  0.99  1.05 
   Inland  1.00  1.00  0.97  1.01  1.00  1.01 
             
Real exchange rate (index)  1.00  1.02  1.03  1.00  1.02  1.02 
             
    Average growth rate (%) 
             
Total GDP (2002 soles)  179,592  3.07  4.18  3.30  3.05  3.23 
   Coastal  125,069  3.11  4.80  3.43  3.09  3.04 
   Inland  54,523  2.99  2.65  2.99  2.95  3.64 
             
Investment demand   37,359  3.00  3.96  3.32  2.89  3.30 
   Coastal  23,409  3.02  5.37  4.60  2.99  2.77 
   Inland  13,950  2.98  1.13  0.79  2.72  4.13 
             
International exports  32,826  2.90  3.99  3.47  2.77  3.03 
   Coastal  18,216  3.28  5.76  3.40  3.26  2.99 
   Inland  14,610  2.42  1.32  3.56  2.13  3.09   12 
Table 3. (Continued) 

















             
International imports  34,576  2.94  4.00  3.36  2.89  3.03 
   Coastal  28,270  2.98  4.39  3.63  2.89  2.96 
   Inland  6,305  2.73  2.12  2.11  2.88  3.34 
             
Regional exports             
   Coastal  23,197  2.97  3.80  2.98  3.10  3.17 
   Inland  9,295  3.29  4.01  5.65  2.73  3.68 
             
    Percentage point contribution to GDP growth rate 
             
Coastal GDP (%)  100.0  3.11  4.80  3.43  3.09  3.04 
   Labor employment  44.8  0.90  1.00  1.02  0.89  0.86 
   Capital stocks  53.7  1.17  1.44  1.33  1.17  1.15 
   Land area  1.5  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
   TFP  0.0  1.01  2.32  1.05  1.01  1.01 
             
Inland GDP (%)  100.0  2.99  2.65  2.99  2.95  3.64 
   Labor employment  45.4  0.90  0.74  0.70  0.92  0.97 
   Capital stocks  45.8  0.97  0.83  0.83  0.94  1.09 
   Land area  8.7  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
   TFP  0.0  0.94  0.90  1.28  0.91  1.41 
             
Source: Peru CGE model results. 
Note: The exchange rate index is local currency units per foreign currency unit (increase is an appreciation). The consumer price 
index is relative to the inland region’s domestic price index (i.e., the model’s numeraire). 
Scenario 2: Faster Nonagricultural Growth along the Coast 
Manufacturing and private services tend to dominate growth in Peru, accounting for 36.5 and 48.2 percent 
of GDP growth, respectively, during 2001-2006 (INEI, 2008). Most of this growth has taken place within 
urban centers along the coast (Giugale et al., 2007). Thus, in the second scenario we simulate an 
expansion of the coastal economy by increasing nonagricultural TFP growth from 1 to 2.5 percent per 
year (excluding the mining sector). This productivity increases the coastal GDP growth rate from 3.1 
percent in the baseline scenario to 4.2 percent per year, which is larger than the increase in TFP (see 
Table 3). Moreover, GDP growth in the inland region falls from 3 to 2.7 percent per year. To understand 
why faster coastal growth comes at the expense of inland growth, we consider the various linkages 
discussed in the previous sections. 
Higher productivity in the coastal region stimulates production, particularly in manufacturing, 
which sees a growth rate increase of an additional 2.2 percentage points (see Table 3). Expanding 
production causes coastal prices to fall relative to inland prices. As a result, exports from the coast to the 
inland region increase by an additional 0.8 percentage points per year, mainly through manufacturing (see 
Table 4). Increased competition undermines growth in the inland region’s heavier manufacturing sectors 
and causes overall manufacturing to contract relative to the Baseline scenario. However, faster growth 
and higher incomes in the coastal region increase the demand for commodities produced in the inland 
region. Unlike the coastal region, though, the increase in the inland regional exports comes at the expense 
of its foreign exports. Inland producers, who are not more productive in this scenario, shift their 
production away from foreign markets towards domestically oriented agricultural sectors (e.g. livestock   13 
and forestry) and light manufacturing (e.g. textiles and clothing). Ultimately, faster growth in the coastal 
region encourages interregional trade, but undermines inland manufacturing and reduces export 
opportunities. It also increases the inland region’s dependency on agricultural production.    14 
Table 4. Sectoral GDP growth results for the growth scenarios 





Percentage point deviation from baseline growth rate 
  Coastal boom  
(2) 
Trans. costs  
(3) 
Social transfer  
(4) 
Inland prod.  
(5) 
  Coast  Inland  Coast  Inland  Coast  Inland  Coast  Inland  Coast  Inland  Coast  Inland 
                          Total GDP   125,069  54,523  3.11  2.99  1.69  -0.35  0.33  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  -0.06  0.65 
                          Agriculture  4,407  9,556  3.05  2.98  0.43  0.11  -0.08  0.19  0.02  0.19  -0.13  0.51 
   Cereals  520  1,097  2.54  2.62  0.48  0.07  0.73  -0.47  0.48  0.25  -0.21  0.38 
   Roots  159  1,420  2.33  2.58  0.58  0.08  0.06  -0.09  0.21  -0.02  -0.25  0.27 
   Horticulture  1,604  3,439  3.06  3.02  -0.16  -0.04  -0.60  0.34  -0.04  0.08  -0.11  0.54 
   Coffee  40  400  2.60  3.63  2.23  -0.59  -1.08  2.59  0.15  -0.36  -0.82  1.44 
   Other export  855  1,164  3.29  2.87  0.06  0.32  0.45  -0.22  -0.24  0.53  0.02  0.36 
   Livestock  483  1,302  3.11  3.25  1.49  0.52  -0.68  0.18  0.21  0.50  -0.26  0.49 
   Forest  22  216  3.26  3.39  1.34  0.65  -0.06  0.11  0.36  0.27  -0.17  0.50 
   Fish  724  519  3.25  3.41  1.17  0.08  0.22  0.07  -0.08  0.22  -0.18  0.82 
                          Mining  2,174  6,016  2.38  2.28  0.98  -1.02  0.28  0.70  0.03  -0.24  -0.19  0.55 
                          Manufacturing  20,056  8,190  3.20  3.04  2.15  -0.24  0.28  -0.33  -0.03  0.03  -0.16  0.67 
   Food  7,253  2,870  3.09  2.84  1.88  0.18  0.40  -0.40  -0.08  0.33  -0.15  0.40 
   Textiles   2,689  1,271  3.59  3.32  3.38  0.32  -0.12  -0.38  0.00  0.14  -0.39  0.55 
   Wood  53  672  3.21  3.57  3.90  0.53  -0.48  0.80  -0.02  -0.28  -0.84  0.63 
   Chemicals  4,768  348  3.12  3.07  1.76  -0.62  0.14  -0.74  0.02  -0.04  -0.08  0.85 
   Non-metals  1,320  804  3.11  3.04  2.34  -1.36  0.89  -1.55  -0.02  -0.20  -0.25  1.06 
   Metals  1,389  1,311  3.04  2.65  1.41  -1.18  0.47  0.59  -0.07  -0.26  0.10  0.82 
   Machinery  982  540  3.36  3.38  2.73  -0.76  0.33  -1.44  0.02  -0.26  -0.23  1.09 
   Other  1,603  373  3.33  3.34  2.23  -0.60  0.20  -0.64  -0.01  -0.12  -0.14  0.99 
                          Construction  7,313  4,422  3.05  3.03  2.40  -1.87  1.43  -2.06  -0.03  -0.29  -0.27  1.21 
Utilities  1,504  2,165  3.04  3.13  1.99  0.26  0.16  0.34  -0.02  -0.15  -0.21  0.49 
                          Trade/transport  40,988  9,380  3.04  2.98  1.52  -0.54  0.26  -0.33  -0.02  0.07  -0.04  0.75 
Regional trade  634  2,681  2.88  2.98  1.03  -0.12  0.66  2.36  0.22  -0.55  0.08  0.60 
Private services  38,649  6,839  3.14  3.10  1.65  -0.19  0.23  -0.30  -0.03  0.02  -0.03  0.68 
Public services  9,343  5,275  3.34  3.50  1.71  0.27  0.39  0.41  0.07  -0.15  0.16  0.38 
                          
Source: Peru CGE model results. 
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Rising productivity increases the returns to capital in the coastal region (see Table 5). This allows 
coastal sectors to attract a greater share of new capital investment, thereby displacing investment in the 
inland region (see Table 3). Faster accumulation of capital in the coastal region also increases the demand 
for labor and places greater upward pressure on coastal wages. This widens the regional wage 
differentials and encourages workers to migrate to the coast (see Table 5). Out-migration is especially 
pronounced for semi-skilled workers, who are used more intensively in the coastal region’s 
nonagricultural sectors. This contributes to a decline in inland manufacturing and private services. In 
contrast, there are relatively fewer job opportunities for lower-skilled workers in the coastal region. 
Although this dampens some of the out-migration of these workers, it further encourages a shift towards 
inland agriculture and lower-skilled manufacturing. Thus, labor migration and slower capital 
accumulation contribute to the inland economy’s decline by reducing the productive capacity of the 
region. 
Table 5. Factor market results for growth scenarios 
  Initial 
values 
















             
Skilled labor wages (2002 soles)           
  Coast  18,031  1.33  2.76  1.78  1.28  1.59 
  Inland  11,811  1.34  2.52  1.65  1.23  1.72 
             
Semi-skilled labor wages (2002 soles)           
  Coast  11,687  1.12  2.33  1.37  1.07  1.28 
  Inland  9,519  1.11  1.85  1.08  1.03  1.45 
             
Unskilled labor wages (2002 soles)           
  Coast  6,167  1.03  2.22  1.18  1.18  1.16 
  Inland  2,916  1.03  1.86  0.86  1.13  1.28 
             
Capital returns   -           
  Coast   -  0.88  1.67  0.97  0.82  0.98 
  Inland   -  0.83  1.30  0.59  0.78  1.00 
             
Land rental rate   -           
  Coast   -  0.96  2.04  0.69  1.07  0.77 
  Inland   -  0.55  1.65  1.36  1.17  0.50 
             
Skilled labor employment (1000s)           
  Coast  758  1.97  2.10  2.10  1.99  1.87 
  Inland  390  2.06  1.81  1.81  2.03  2.24 
             
Semi-skilled labor employment (1000s)           
  Coast  2,539  2.01  2.23  2.30  2.01  1.92 
  Inland  1,225  1.98  1.50  1.35  1.98  2.16 
             
Unskilled labor employment (1000s)           
  Coast  2,050  2.06  2.39  2.44  1.90  1.94 
  Inland  2,917  1.96  1.72  1.68  2.07  2.04 
             
Capital stock   -           
  Coast   -  2.18  2.69  2.47  2.18  2.13 
  Inland   -  2.12  1.81  1.81  2.06  2.38 
             
Source: Peru CGE model results.  
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Although GDP falls in the inland region, there is higher overall growth at the national level. This 
raises national tax revenues and permits an expansion of the public sector in both the coastal and inland 
regions (see Table 3). Therefore, with falling or stagnant growth in most inland sectors, the public sector 
becomes an important source of inland growth and employment. This offsets some of the migration of 
higher-skilled workers from the inland region. Moreover, while the out-migration of workers causes 
inland dependency ratios to rise (see Table 6), it does not affect the provision of per capita-based social 
transfers, which are mainly financed by coastal taxes. Thus, with a booming coastal region, the public 
sector becomes an increasingly important part of the inland region’s economy.  
Table 6. Household results for growth scenarios 
   
Initial 
values 
Average growth rate (%) 















              Population (1000s)  26,420  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
   Coastal   13,109  2.01  2.11  2.13  1.99  1.97 
   Inland   13,311  1.99  1.89  1.87  2.01  2.03 
              Dependency ratio (people)  2.67  2.67  2.67  2.67  2.67  2.67 
   Coastal   2.45  2.45  2.41  2.41  2.46  2.46 
   Inland   2.94  2.94  3.00  3.01  2.93  2.92 
              Per capita equivalent variation (2002 soles)           
   Coastal rural   3,212  1.03  2.31  1.35  1.42  1.03 
   Coastal urban  8,096  1.10  2.53  1.37  0.95  1.12 
   Inland rural  1,592  0.90  1.61  0.53  2.42  1.18 
   Inland urban  5,182  1.03  1.72  0.53  0.97  1.33 
              
Source: Peru CGE model results 
Note: Dependency ratio is the number of non-working people per worker. Equivalent variation is a welfare measure (i.e., 
additional income required to increase household utility to its final year value based on initial prices). Initial values are annual per 
capita expenditures. 
 
The above results suggest that regional trade and factor market linkages are not weak. Rather, 
they act against growth in the inland region, with the public sector only partially offsetting these adverse 
linkages. This implies that there is greater economic divergence as a result of the coastal and inland 
regions being part of the same country. However, while GDP declines in the inland region, its factor 
returns increase in real terms due to decreases in local prices and the falling cost of goods imported from 
the coast (see Table 5). This allows real incomes to rise, especially for rural households, which also 
benefit from increases in the food crops, livestock and textile sectors. Accordingly, most of the income 
growth among rural inland households comes from higher returns to land and unskilled labor. However, 
coastal households see greater income increases, driven by increased employment opportunities and 
falling consumer prices.  
In summary, all households in Peru benefit from faster growth in the coastal economy. However, 
there is a widening income gap between coastal and inland households, and greater regional divergence in 
economic growth. Furthermore, there is an increased specialization of the inland economy in agriculture 
and public services. This suggests that, despite positive public sector linkages, regional trade and 
migration linkages reinforce slower growth in the Sierra and Selva regions compared to the coastal 
region. This is consistent with the observed divergence in regional incomes and the persistence of inland 
poverty despite the accelerated economywide growth seen in recent years.  
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5. POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE REGIONAL CONVERGENCE 
Faster growth in the coastal economy increases regional divergence, partly by slowing growth in the 
inland region. Thus, Peru cannot rely solely on national growth to significantly reduce poverty throughout 
the country. Overcoming the regional development trap will require targeted policies that increase the 
participation of lagging regions in the national growth process. In this section, we consider potential 
policies designed to encourage regional convergence, including road investments aimed at reducing 
interregional transaction costs; the use of mining taxes to finance transfers to rural households; and 
productivity-enhancing investments within the lagging region. 
In order to make the policy scenarios comparable, we use the same fiscal envelope for each 
simulation. In the social transfer scenario, we provide a conditional cash transfer of US$30 to all poor 
rural households in both regions of Peru. This is similar to an existing program in Peru called Pro-Peru, 
which provides US$30 cash transfers to poor rural households with children under the age of 14 years 
(World Bank, 2005). The budget allocated to these transfers in 2006 was 200 million Nuevos Soles, 
covering about 170,000 households. In our scenario, we provide transfers to all 1.3 million poor rural 
households at a total cost of 1.6 billion Nuevos Soles, or US$435 million. This is equivalent to 6 percent 
of government revenues or 0.9 percent of total GDP in 2002. We use the same amount of public resources 
for the two investment scenarios, where we increase government spending on interregional roads and 
inland productivity. For comparability, we also use the same investment-productivity elasticities for the 
two investment scenarios. We assume that a 1 percent increase in public expenditure yields a 0.08 percent 
increase in national TFP. This is consistent with findings from other countries on the returns to public 
investment (see, for example, Fan et al., 2004). Finally, we assume that the government finances 
additional transfers and investments by raising mining and corporate tax collection rates by approximately 
2.5 percentage points, so as to maintain the fiscal deficit.
6
Scenario 3: Reducing interregional transaction costs  
 The three policy scenarios are therefore 
comparable, since they involve the same additional expenditures, assume the same returns on 
investments, and involve the same tax rate adjustments. 
There are high transaction costs between the coastal and inland regions. We compare consumer prices for 
similar commodities in markets close to the border between the two regions,
7
This raises Peru’s national GDP growth rate from 3.1 to 3.3 percent per year (see Table 3). 
However, this is driven entirely by faster growth in the coastal region, with overall growth in the inland 
region remaining unchanged. To understand these outcomes, we again consider the various linkages 
between the two regions. 
 and use these price 
differences to estimate the trade margin associated with moving goods from the lowland coastal region to 
the highland Sierra region. The price differentials range from 10 percent for nonagricultural goods (e.g. 
machinery) to 36 percent for perishable agricultural goods (e.g. vegetables). In the first policy scenario, 
we examine the impact of reducing these transaction costs by investing in interregional roads, thereby 
improving the efficiency of regional trade. More specifically, we increase TFP in the regional trade sector 
by 10 percent per year. This halves the price of trade services between the two regions over the 10-year 
simulation period. At the national level, TFP growth increases by an additional 0.15 percentage points per 
year, which is consistent with an investment-productivity elasticity of 0.1.  
Lowering transaction costs increases the competitiveness of inland goods in coastal markets. 
Accordingly, exports to the coastal region grow more rapidly at 5.7 percent per year, which is 
considerably higher than the 3.3 percent growth rate seen under the baseline scenario (see Table 3). 
Agricultural exports grow particularly fast due to high initial transaction costs, with growth driven by the 
                                                       
6 Collection rates are based on actual funds received by the government and are thus lower than statutory rates due to tax 
exemptions and evasion.  
7 From author worksheets.  
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fruit, vegetables and livestock product sectors. Lowering transaction costs also improves the inland 
region’s access to foreign markets. Foreign exports therefore also expand, primarily due to the coffee, 
wood, and non-ferrous metal sectors. This strong export performance generates faster GDP growth, 
especially in agriculture (see Table 4). However, the reduction of transaction costs also increases import 
competition in inland markets, primarily from coastally manufactured goods. The GDP growth rate of 
inland manufacturing declines and the inland economy becomes more dominated by agricultural 
production. Thus, reducing transaction costs encourages structural changes based on each region’s 
comparative advantage; for the inland region, this involves a shift into agriculture.  
The rising importance of agriculture in the inland region has implications for the labor and capital 
markets. Agriculture is much less capital-intensive than manufacturing, meaning that a shift into 
agriculture reduces the returns to capital in the inland region. This is reflected in the falling contribution 
of capital to growth in the inland region (see Table 3). The decrease in capital returns in the inland region 
diverts new investments towards the coast, with subsequent investment decreases reducing GDP growth 
for the inland region’s construction and machinery sectors (see Table 4). In contrast, the expansion of 
coastal manufacturing increases investments in this region, with growth spillovers into less skill-intensive 
construction. Thus, while the returns to agricultural land rise substantially in the inland region, the returns 
to semi- and unskilled labor fall relative to those in the coastal region, leading to faster out-migration of 
workers to the coastal region (see Table 5). Ultimately, reducing the economic distance between the two 
regions encourages greater regional specialization. Furthermore, the inland region’s shift out of 
manufacturing and into agriculture offsets improvements in export opportunities for inland producers. 
Consequently, while there is a significant change in the composition of inland growth, there is no effect 
on the region’s overall GDP growth rate. 
Faster coastal growth leads to greater regional divergence in both GDP and per capita expenditure 
(see Table 6). First, the out-migration of workers drives up the dependency ratios in the inland region, 
meaning that each worker’s labor income is now distributed across a larger non-working population. The 
reverse is true for the coastal region. Second, households in the coastal region benefit from faster 
economic growth and lower prices for agricultural goods from the inland region. Real incomes and per 
capita expenditures for coastal households rise accordingly, driven mainly by higher returns to lower-
skilled labor for rural households and higher returns to capital for urban households. In contrast, the shift 
into inland agriculture increases land returns but reduces capital returns, meaning that inland urban 
incomes fall by more than rural incomes. However, rural households spend a larger share of their incomes 
on agricultural goods, which show rising prices due to increased demand for inland exports in the coastal 
region. Urban households, on the other hand, spend more of their incomes on manufactured goods, which 
show price decreases due to the falling costs of imports from the coast. Taken together, these changes in 
dependency ratios, incomes and prices produce similarly large declines in per capita expenditure for rural 
and urban households in the inland region.  
In summary, reducing transaction costs to lessen the consequences of Peru’s internal geographic 
divide may produce adverse outcomes. On one hand, this strategy is projected to provide inland 
agricultural producers with greater opportunities to supply coastal markets, thereby stimulating 
interregional trade and increasing the returns to land. However, this shift into agriculture, which is 
strengthened by rising import competition from coastal producers, does not bring about regional 
convergence. Rather, it reduces incentives for capital investment in the inland region, thereby 
undermining manufacturing employment opportunities and encouraging faster out-migration to the coast. 
While migration provides inland households with an exit option, this is constrained by the coastal 
region’s capacity to absorb new migrants. Ultimately, reducing interregional transaction costs favors 
faster economic growth at the national level, but lowers incomes in the lagging region and exacerbates 
regional divergence.  
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Scenario 4: Expanding Social Transfers to Rural Households  
A second policy option is to tax urban-based growth to finance social transfers to low-income households. 
This approach has been adopted by the Peruvian government, which in recent years has spent 
considerable resources on welfare programs aimed at reducing poverty. The bulk of these programs have 
focused on improving nutrition and providing social safety nets, such as temporary worker programs. As 
mentioned above, the government recently implemented a new program that provides conditional cash 
transfers to poor rural households throughout the country. Here, we simulate a similar transfer program 
and examine both the impact of the transfer on household incomes and the impact of the increased taxes 
that would be necessary to finance the program.  
The conditional cash transfer has a profound impact on rural incomes. Since the transfer is 
provided to all poor rural households, rural incomes increase in both the coastal and inland regions. 
However, since the majority of Peru’s poor rural population lives in the inland region, the incomes of 
these households rise by substantially more. Our model results show that in the inland region, the growth 
rate in rural per capita expenditure rises from 0.9 percent per year under the baseline scenario to 2.4 
percent per year under the social transfer scenario (see Table 6). Since urban households generate the vast 
majority of government tax revenues, the increased corporate and personal tax reduces disposable 
incomes for these households in both regions. However, given their initially higher incomes in absolute 
terms, the percentage decline in urban expenditure is substantially lower than the percentage increase in 
rural expenditure. Furthermore, coastal urban households pay higher average tax rates, so their per capita 
expenditure declines by more relative to the baseline scenario. The social transfer program therefore 
effectively reduces both rural-urban inequality and regional income divergence, but has little effect on 
aggregate national income.  
The model suggests that social transfers produce few growth effects at the national level, with the 
aggregate GDP growth rate remaining largely unchanged (see Table 3). This is partly a result of the 
model’s specification, which assumes that there is full employment in the inland region. This supply 
constraint may not reflect the capacity of the inland region to respond to a demand-led stimulus. 
However, even assuming full employment, the model results suggest that some rural growth linkages 
emerge as a result of the social transfers. While the social transfer accounts for most of the increase in per 
capita income under the transfer scenario, there is also an expansion in the returns to land and lower-
skilled labor. This is caused by increased demand for agricultural goods. Poor rural households spend a 
larger share of their incomes on commodities produced within the inland region. As such, providing 
additional incomes to these households stimulates growth in agricultural GDP growth and light 
manufacturing, such as the food processing, textile and clothing sectors (see Table 4). Thus, about a 
quarter of rural inland households’ income growth under the social transfer scenario is due to demand 
multipliers or regional growth linkages.  
At the national level, faster income growth in the inland region increases the region’s demand for 
imported goods, but reduces export incentives for inland producers. Coastal exports to the inland region 
therefore grow more rapidly under the social transfer scenario, driven by heavier manufacturing (see 
Table 3). Again, rising demand for coastally manufactured goods and the shift into inland agriculture 
increases the returns to investment along the coast. For this reason, the coastal region is less affected by 
the decline in overall investment, which is caused by falling urban incomes and the higher savings rates of 
urban households. However, despite some sectoral and regional shifts in the structure of production, the 
macroeconomic impacts of social transfers remain relatively small.  
Scenario 5: Productivity-enhancing investments in the highlands  
We see above that social transfers reduce regional and rural-urban inequality without greatly reducing 
economic growth, while investments in interregional infrastructure promote growth, but this is 
concentrated along the coast. These two policy scenarios highlight a potential trade-off between growth 
and equity objectives. In this section, we examine the impact of investing directly in productivity growth 
in the lagging region. Although we do not model specific policies, such growth could arise through a  
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number of initiatives in the government’s national and rural development strategies. For example, 
inadequate extension services are seen as a binding constraint limiting further rural development in the 
highland region, and it has been suggested that improvements in extension services in the region would 
raise crop yields and overall agricultural productivity (World Bank, 2005). Poor access to credit is a 
further constraint affecting both farm and non-farm sectors (Laszlo and Santor, 2004). Finally, investing 
in rural roads to improve access to local markets has been shown to enhance incomes (Escobal and 
Valdivia, 2004). To model these interventions, we increase the TFP growth rate in the inland region’s 
agricultural, manufacturing and trade sectors by an additional 1 percentage point per year. By including 
the local trade sector, we capture investments in rural roads similarly to how they are captured in the 
transaction cost scenario. As with the previous scenarios, we increase public expenditures and social 
transfers by the same amount, while increasing TFP growth such that the productivity-investment 
elasticity is 0.08. 
Raising productivity in the inland region produces results that mirror those of the coastal boom 
scenario. GDP growth accelerates in the inland region, especially for agricultural exports, such as 
horticultural products and coffee (see Table 4). Inland manufacturing also benefits from stronger 
productivity growth, especially in the textile, wood and non-metallic mineral product sectors. Coastal 
production declines slightly as a result of increased export competition, while the coastal region benefits 
from expanded demand from the inland economy. However, unlike in the coastal boom scenario, regional 
demand is insufficient to offset import competition, and GDP growth declines even in sectors where the 
coastal region has a comparative advantage. Overall, GDP growth in the inland region accelerates from 3 
to 3.7 percent per year, but slows slightly along the coast. 
Inland growth raises factor demands, which leads to higher returns in the region compared to the 
coast. This encourages greater investment in the inland region (see Table 3) and a reversal of out-
migration from the lagging region. Skilled and semi-skilled labor benefit from expanding manufacturing 
employment in the inland economy, while land returns rise due to increased agricultural production. This 
shift in the flow of labor migration increases the productive capacity of the inland region, further 
supporting faster overall economic growth. Increased employment opportunities also favor income 
growth for households located in the inland region. While inland rural households benefit from higher 
labor incomes, the returns to land decline as agricultural prices fall in response to increased production 
and fewer market opportunities. Urban incomes therefore rise more rapidly than rural incomes, but falling 
agricultural prices increase the real incomes for both rural and urban households and allow per capita 
expenditure to rise (see Table 6). Productivity-enhancing investments therefore encourage regional 
convergence and economic diversification within the inland region. However, they also widen the gap 
between rural and urban incomes, primarily due to market constraints that limit farm production. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Peru has made considerable progress in accelerating and sustaining its economic growth since the 
macroeconomic crisis of the late 1990s. However, despite the economic recovery of this country, the 
severe poverty in the lagging inland regions has remained largely unchanged. The resilience of inland 
poverty suggests that either the lagging region is not well connected to the coastal-led growth process, or 
the existing linkages work against regional convergence. By combining evidence from numerous sources 
into a consistent multi-regional SAM, we herein capture and quantify the relative importance of these 
linkages and show that it would be misleading to treat the inland region as if it were de-linked from the 
coast. 
We first use the model to examine the effects of Peru’s coastal-led growth process, and find that 
accelerated growth in the coastal economy undermines economic growth in the inland region, primarily 
through the out-migration of workers to the coast and a shift in investment towards the fast-growing 
coastal region. However, both inland and coastal households are better off due to the positive effect of 
coastal growth on labor wages and land returns. From these growth scenarios, we conclude that coastal-
led growth produces adverse outcomes for the inland region. Therefore, policies focusing on accelerating 
national growth rates will be insufficient to encourage economic growth and regional convergence.  
We then use the model to assess alternative policy options aimed at reducing regional income 
inequality. We first consider the effects of lowering interregional transaction costs in order to reduce the 
economic distance between the inland region and the coastal and international markets. We find that 
improving road infrastructure between the two regions is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it enhances 
export opportunities for inland producers, especially for agricultural goods. On the other hand, it allows 
greater market penetration by coastal producers, which undermines the inland region’s manufacturing 
sector. This encourages capital and semi-skilled labor to migrate to the coastal region, where employment 
opportunities and returns are better. Transaction costs therefore act as a non-tariff barrier preventing 
coastal producers from displacing better-paying inland jobs. Reducing these margins causes the inland 
region to shift towards its comparative advantage in lower-paying agriculture, which worsens inland 
incomes and increases regional inequality.  
The second policy that we consider is the extension of social transfers to poor rural households. 
This effectively reduces regional and rural-urban inequality and generates positive growth linkages within 
the inland rural economy without substantially reducing urban incomes. However, the transfers have little 
effect on economic growth at the national level. Given the positive growth effects of the other policy 
options, this scenario highlights the opportunity cost of social transfers and the trade-offs among national 
growth, regional equity, and social welfare. However, in the model we assume that productivity growth is 
unaffected by the transfers and we limit demand-side effects by assuming full employment. Further 
micro-level analysis will be required in order for us to fully understand the relationships among social 
transfers, productivity and employment.  
The third policy option we consider is investment in agricultural and manufacturing productivity 
in the inland region, such as that through agricultural extension, credit provision and rural roads. Such 
investments accelerate inland growth, but at the expense of the coastal economy, primarily due to 
increased competition over factors. However, growth in inland agriculture is constrained by markets, with 
agricultural prices falling significantly after production increases. Thus, while these policies encourage 
regional convergence, they exacerbate rural-urban inequality.  
The inability of individual policy options to address both growth and inequality highlights the 
importance of packaging and sequencing interventions. For example, reducing interregional transaction 
costs without investing in inland productivity opens the inland region to greater import competition 
without improving the ability of inland producers to compete for export opportunities in coastal markets. 
Similarly, investing in inland productivity without improving market access causes prices to fall and 
yields fewer benefits for smallholder farmers. These market constraints could be avoided (at least 
partially) through demand-side injections via social transfers.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. CGE model sets, variables and parameters 
Sets       
a   Activities and commodities     Households 
( )  Factors (labor/capital)   ( )  Trade regions (domestic/foreign) 
  Time periods ( )     
Variables       
  National average capital rental rate    Per capita household demand  
  Consumer & producer price indices    Investment demand quantity 
  Sectoral capital allocation    Intermediate commodity demand  
  Trade margin per unit traded    Composite commodity quantity 
  Activity price    Transaction cost quantity 
  Domestic price    Trade quantity 
  Composite commodity price    Value-added quantity 
  Trade price (excl. export margins)    Sectoral wage distortion  
  Value-added price    Regional average factor returns  
  Activity production quantity     Exchange rate (LCU per FCU)  
  Domestically sold quantity     Factor income 
  Factor demand quantity    Government revenue 
  Government demand quantity    Household income 
Parameters       
  Investment-capital adjustment    Intermediate & value-added shares 
  Compensation wage adjustment    Domestic sales trade margin rate 
  Production & trade shift parameter    Share of dependents migrating 
  Consumer & producer price shares    Household labor endowment 
  Government budget share    Household population per worker 
  Household marginal budget share    Per capita social transfers  
  Investment demand share    Labor & TFP growth rate 
  Capital allocation adjustment     Number of new migrants 
  Wage-migration elasticity    World export and import prices 
  Subsistence consumption    Total factor supply 
  Regional capital stock    Regional & foreign remittance rate 
  Production & trade shares     Absolute value of foreign savings 
  Production & trade exponent    Public & private savings rates 
  Export & import trade margin rate    Corporate & personal tax rates 
  Household factor income shares    Import tariff and sales tax rates 
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Table A2. CGE model equations 
Within-period prices   
Foreign export price   
Foreign import price   
Export & import trade margins      and      
Absorption    
Marketed output value   
Activity revenue and costs   
Consumer & producer price indices     and     
Within-period production and trade   
CES production function   
CES production function  
(first-order condition)   
Leontief intermediate demand    
Leontief aggregate value-added    
CET export function   
CET export function  
(first-order condition)   
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Table A2 continued. CGE model equations 
Non-exported or produced commodities    
Armington import function   
Armington import function  
(first-order condition)   
Non-imported or produced commodities   
Transaction services demand   
Within-period incomes and demand   
Factor incomes   
Household incomes   
Government revenues   
Per capita household consumption demand   
Government consumption demand   
Investment demand   
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Table A2 continued. CGE model equations 
   
National average capital returns   
Within-period system constraints   
Factor market equilibrium      where     
Commodity market equilibrium   
Current account balance   
Between-period capital accumulation   
Conversion & allocation of past investment 
into new capital stocks 
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Table A3. Regional and international trade elasticities in the model 
        Maize  4.45  Clothing and footwear  3.70 
Other cereals  4.45  Wood products  3.40 
Potatoes  3.25  Paper products  2.95 
Roots and tubers  3.25  Chemicals  2.10 
Fruits  1.35  Non-metallic minerals  2.90 
Vegetables  1.35  Ferrous metals  2.95 
Cotton  2.50  Non-ferrous metals  4.20 
Coffee  1.15  Metal products  3.75 
Sugar  2.70  Machinery and vehicles  4.05 
Other cash crops  3.25  Other manufacturing  3.75 
Cattle  2.00  Construction  1.90 
Poultry  0.90  Electricity and water  2.80 
Other livestock  2.00  Trade services  1.50 
Forestry  2.50  Hotel and catering  0.50 
Fishing  1.25  Transport and communication services  0.50 
Mining  0.90  Business and real estate services  0.50 
Food processing  3.50  Community and other services  0.50 
Textiles  3.75  Government services  0.50 
       
Source: Dimaranan et al. 2006.  
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